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“As I waited I thought that there’s nothing like a confession to make
one look mad; and that of all confessions a written one is the most
detrimental all round. Never confess! Never, never!”1
“Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.”2
June 13, 2016, marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.3 Miranda is among the rare cases that has
transcended the legal profession and become a fixture in popular culture. Time
Magazine ranked Miranda as the third most controversial Supreme Court case
in U.S. history, trailing behind only Brown v. Board of Education4 and Roe v.
Wade.5 Miranda has become a favorite subject for cartoonists of all stripes—
recurring characters include philandering husbands, recalcitrant children, and
+
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1. JOSEPH CONRAD, CHANCE (1913), as reprinted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 240, ¶ 12 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 6th ed., 2004).
2. The quotation is attributed to Mark Twain. The actual quotation is, “The report of my
death was an exaggeration.” Mark Twain, NEW YORK JOURNAL, June 2, 1897, as reprinted in
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 1, at 803, ¶ 29.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Time’s list of the top ten most controversial cases is rounded out by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803). See Top 10 Controversial Supreme Court Cases, TIME (Dec. 13, 2010), http://content.
time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,2036448,00.html; see also Alexandra
Silver, The Supremes: Miranda v. Arizona, TIME (Dec. 13, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036448_2036452_2036453,00.html (listing Miranda v.
Arizona as the third most controversial Supreme Court case of all time).
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mimes6—and it is common fare for movies and television shows.7 Indeed,
Miranda may be the only criminal case to have morphed into a verb—to
“Mirandize.”8
The Miranda decision has likewise provoked strong reactions within the legal
community. Professor Henry Abraham wrote that Miranda “must rank as the
most bitterly criticized, most contentious, and most diversely analyzed criminal
procedure decision by the Warren Court.”9 Professor Yale Kamisar, a noted
Miranda defender, observed Miranda is “one of the most praised, most
maligned—and probably one of the most misunderstood—U.S. Supreme Court
cases in American history.”10 Professor Joseph Grano, one of Miranda’s
harshest critics, called the opinion “exceedingly atypical.”11 Perhaps no other
criminal justice decision by the Court has been as polarizing.
As Miranda approaches its golden years, it has become pervasive and
unremarkable. At least two generations of Americans have grown up with
Miranda and have never been exposed to any other dominant approach for
determining the admissibility of criminal confessions. Miranda has achieved
almost universal acquiescence, if not approval—an inevitability that evokes
neither praise nor criticism, but rather passive acceptance. Like the DMV and
the weather, Miranda has become an established fact of life because a better
alternative is no longer imagined nor seems realistically possible.
The present-day nonchalance toward Miranda can obscure and misportray its
divisive and embattled past. The truth is the Miranda decision was under
constant and serious attack for decades. Indeed, there once was a time when it

6. A personal favorite is a cartoon depicting a flight attendant who incorporates Miranda
warnings into a pre-flight safety briefing. See Airline Security, Miranda Warnings. Chrsitmas
Bomber, DANZIGER CARTOONS (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.danzigercartoons.com/cartoons/
february-18-2010-airline-security-miranda-warning-chrsitmas-bomber.
7. A recent example of a comedic treatment of the Miranda warnings can be found in the
movie “21 Jump Street.” Eriecartel, 21 Jump Street–Channing Tatum Miranda Rights
Scene, YOUTUBE (July 6, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T45aF1NLMyMMor.
8. See Definition of Mirandize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Mirandize (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (defining “Mirandize” as a transitive
verb meaning “to recite the Miranda warnings to (a person under arrest)”). The only somewhat
similar example that comes to mind is how Judge Robert Bork’s last name became a verb, as in “he
was Borked.” See Definition of Bork, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Bork (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (defining “Bork” as “to attack or defeat
(a nominee or candidate for public office) unfairly through an organized campaign of harsh public
criticism or vilification”).
9. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 125 (4th ed. 1982).
10. See Yale Kamisar, Miranda’s Reprieve, ABA J. (Jun. 23, 2006, 1:06 PM), http://www.
abajournal.com/magazine/article/mirandas_reprieve/.
11. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173 (1993).
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appeared likely, even certain, that Miranda would be overruled.12 Miranda’s
fiftieth anniversary offers an opportunity to reflect upon its controversial origins
and circuitous journey, revisit its near demise, and contemplate its current status
and import.
I. THE PRELUDE TO MIRANDA
Before Miranda, criminal confession jurisprudence in America traced its
origins to the English common law.13 By the 1960s, the admissibility of a
confession turned on whether it was deemed to be involuntarily obtained; that
is, whether a suspect’s free will was so likely to have been overborn by undue
police pressure that any incriminating statements made by the suspect would be
excluded from evidence.14 The courts applied a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, in which they considered all of the relevant facts relating to the
questioning of the suspect, including the suspect’s traits and background, the
conditions of the interrogation, and the actions of the police, in light of broader
values implicated by the use of confessions to prove guilt.15 If the police were
found to have gone too far, the confession would be declared involuntary and
suppressed at the suspect’s trial.16
The defense bar and many academics criticized the traditional involuntariness
approach. They complained that it was necessarily ad hoc and case specific, and
thus the involuntariness approach failed to provide meaningful standards for the
12. See Victor Li, 50-year Story of the Miranda Warning Has the Twists of a Cop Show, ABA
J. (Aug. 1, 2016, 4:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/miranda_warning_
history/.
13. At common law, coerced confessions were excluded from evidence because of a fear they
were untrustworthy. By the eighteenth century, it was established that “a confession forced from
the mind by flattery of hope, or the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to
be considered as evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.”
Rex v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B.). This was the standard of review employed
by the Supreme Court beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding
confessions must be excluded where the defendants were whipped until they agreed to confess as
officers dictated). Over time, the involuntariness of the confession itself became the basis for its
exclusion, “irrespective of any attempt to measure its influence to cause a false confession.” 3
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 825 (James H. Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1970).
14. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319–20, 323 (1959) (holding a post-indictment
confession, obtained by police with the intent of securing a statement that could be used to convict
the suspect, violated due process because the suspect’s will was overborne by official pressure,
fatigue, and false sympathy); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153–54 (1944) (holding a
confession obtained from a suspect, after 36 consecutive hours of incommunicado questioning, was
so “inherently coercive” as to be presumptively involuntary and compelled).
15. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–08 (1960) (explaining that involuntariness
is a “convenient shorthand” for “a complex of values” relating to the constitutionality of a
confession); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953) (“The limits in any case depend upon a
weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person
confessing.”).
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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police or guidance for courts in future cases.17 Moreover, they argued that it was
largely ineffective in protecting the constitutional rights of criminal suspects,
especially when naive or under-educated arrestees were subjected to the
increasingly sophisticated and psychologically-based methods of interrogation
now used by law enforcement.18 More broadly, civil libertarians viewed the
traditional involuntariness approach as part of a larger, unjust regime that denied
defendants and criminal suspects the capacity to effectively exercise their
constitutional rights.19
If the customary approach to constitutional protections was the malady, then
the Warren Court intended to dispense the cure. From 1953 to 1969, Earl
Warren presided as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.20 Under Warren’s
leadership, the Court aggressively tackled a wide range of controversial matters,
announcing landmark decisions that addressed racial segregation and

17. See Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L.
REV. 551, 570 (1984) (observing that under the traditional involuntariness test, “[a]lmost
everything was relevant, but almost nothing was decisive”). As one observer put it,
Given the Court’s inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition of
“voluntariness,” the apparent persistence of state courts in utilizing the ambiguity of the
concept to validate confessions of doubtful constitutionality, and the resultant burden on
its own workload, it seemed inevitable that the Court would seek “some automatic device
by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] be controlled.”
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 102–03
(footnotes omitted).
18. See David L. Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. PUB.
L. 25, 37–39, 46 (1965) (observing that “if the American police manuals are examined, there is a
striking similarity between their recommendations and Russian and Chinese interrogation
techniques”); Yale Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the “New”
Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1966) (contending
that the protections afforded by the traditional involuntariness approach “were largely ‘illusory’”).
19. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (1985)
(observing that a majority of the Court viewed confessions “darkly as the product of police
coercion”). See generally LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 14–17 (1983)
(describing generally the negative attitudes of civil libertarians during the 1950s and 1960s toward
police practices and the obtaining of confessions and some initiatives intended to address this).
20. Earl Warren, UNITED STATES HISTORY, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h3834.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2017). Before joining the Court, Earl Warren had never been a judge, and his
background was largely political in nature. Id. Early in his career, Warren was a District Attorney
and then Attorney General of California. Id. He later became a three-term governor of California
and ran unsuccessfully for vice president on the Dewey ticket in 1948. Id. In 1952, Warren played
a key role in securing the Republican presidential nomination for Dwight D. Eisenhower; in return,
Eisenhower promised Warren an appointment to the Supreme Court when a vacancy occurred. Id.
Warren was appointed as Chief Justice in 1953, when Chief Justice Fred Vinson unexpectedly died.
Id. When Eisenhower appointed Warren to the Court, he said that Warren “represents the kind of
political, economic, and social thinking that I believe we need on the Supreme Court . . . he has a
national name for integrity, uprightness, and courage that, again, I believe we need on the Court.”
Id. Years later, Eisenhower called his appointment of Warren “[t]he biggest damned-fool mistake
I ever made.” Id.
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discrimination,21 voting redistricting and malapportionment,22 free speech,23 and
the free exercise of religion.24 The Warren Court also focused on the criminal
justice system, deciding issues relating to the basis and scope of searches and
seizures,25 discovery,26 incorporating and applying federal constitutional
protections at state trials,27 and criminal punishment.28
Promoting the availability and assistance of defense counsel was of special
importance to the Warren Court. Beginning in 1963, the Court announced three

21. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding laws prohibiting interracial
marriages unconstitutional); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–48 (1960) (holding that
electoral district boundaries disenfranchised black voters); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (ordering the desegregation of District of Columbia public schools); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding state laws establishing separate public schools for
black and white students unconstitutional).
22. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558–59 (1964) (holding that state legislative
districts had to be roughly equal in population, basing the decision on the principle of “one person,
one vote”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964) (requiring each state to draw its U.S.
Congressional districts so that they are approximately equal in population); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 199–200 (1962) (holding federal courts may intervene and decide redistricting issues).
23. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (holding that the
government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is directed to inciting, and is
likely to incite, imminent lawless action); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964) (establishing the actual malice standard that has to be met before press reports about public
officials can be considered to be defamation and libel); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318–
19 (1957) (holding that the First Amendment protected radical and reactionary speech).
24. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment required the government demonstrate both a compelling interest
and that the law in question is narrowly tailored before denying unemployment compensation to
someone who was fired because her job requirements substantially conflicted with her religion).
25. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a
suspect on the street and frisks him without probable cause to arrest if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a
reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous”); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that the intrusion on justifiable
expectations of privacy was the basis for determining whether a search under the Fourth
Amendment had occurred).
26. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the withholding of
exculpatory evidence violates due process “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment”).
27. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination is a fundamental right applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are incorporated though the
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a fundamental right applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment).
28. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (striking down a California
law that criminalized being addicted to narcotics); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (holding
it unconstitutional for the government to revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen as a punishment).
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important decisions concerning the right to counsel.29 First, in Gideon v.
Wainwright,30 the Court held that states are required under the Fourteenth
Amendment31 to provide counsel to represent defendants in criminal cases who
are unable to afford to pay for their own attorneys.32 A year later, in Escobedo
v. Illinois,33 the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment34 is violated when police
question a custodial suspect who is the focus of their investigation in the absence
of counsel if the suspect has requested counsel.35 These decisions demonstrated
the Warren Court’s willingness to depart, even radically, from past practices to
protect the rights of criminal suspects, and further signaled the Court’s belief
that it still had more work to do. The Court’s next project—the third decision in
the trilogy of major right-to-counsel cases—would address the expansion of the
Fifth Amendment36 protections. Miranda would become the vehicle to
accomplish this objective.37
II. THE MIRANDA DECISION
In the early morning hours of March 3, 1963, Ernesto Miranda abducted,
raped, and robbed a young woman as she walked toward her home in Phoenix,

29. The Warren Court issued several other notable decisions relating to the right to counsel,
including Malloy, 378 U.S. at 9 (holding the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is a fundamental right applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment);
and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204–05 (1964) (holding that the government may not
deliberately elicit statements from a person under indictment in the absence of counsel).
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343.
33. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–91. Perhaps Escabedo’s most enduring significance is that it
foreshadowed Miranda insofar as it reflected the Warren Court’s negative attitudes regarding police
interrogations and confessions thereby obtained to prove guilt. See Joseph D. Grano, Selling the
Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 662, 666 (1986) (reviewing FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986)).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37. Some commentators have speculated that the Miranda rights warning and waiver
protocols were not the ultimate objective of the Warren Court. Rather, the Court was moving
toward an end game in which custodial interrogation would be permitted only in the presence of a
lawyer. See OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 205
(1973). They speculate that the Court approached its ultimate objective incrementally, going as far
as it could as fast as it could at the time. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal
Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 12 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar I]
(contending that critics who complain that Miranda did not go far enough “do not seem to
appreciate the fact that in 1966 the Court was barely able to go as far as it did”). As a result of the
firestorm that followed the Miranda decision, coupled with later changes in the Court’s
membership, the final objective of requiring the presence of counsel at all times during custodial
interrogation, if it was ever actually intended by the Warren Court, was never realized.
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Arizona.38 A few days later, Miranda was arrested by police and, without the
assistance of counsel, was placed in a lineup and interrogated.39 After a short
while, Miranda confessed to these and other, unrelated crimes.40 It was not until
after Miranda made his confession that he was first advised of his rights,
including his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.41 Miranda’s confession was
later admitted at his trial over his objection, and he was convicted.42 Miranda
appealed the admissibility of his confession to no avail in the lower courts,43
and, losing there, sought certiorari in the Supreme Court.44
At about the same time, the Warren Court was actively looking to grant
certiorari in confession cases as a means for further expanding a criminal
suspect’s right to counsel.45 The Court eventually settled on Miranda’s case and
three others, in part because the facts of those four cases seemed less
inflammatory than those in many of the other suitable cases, which often
involved brutal murders or child victims.46
Miranda’s attorneys, John Flynn and John Frank, argued over whether to
focus primarily on an alleged denial of their client’s Fifth Amendment or Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.47 Accordingly, the lawyers hedged their bets and
prepared to argue both theories.48 At oral argument, Flynn took his cue from the
Justices’ questioning and concentrated on a Fifth Amendment theory for
reversal.49
Ultimately, in a 5–4 vote, Warren announced the Court’s decision in Miranda
v. Arizona.50 The Court held that statements stemming from custodial
interrogation cannot be admitted at trial unless the prosecution demonstrates the
use of safeguards securing the privilege against self-incrimination.51 The Court

38. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 3–5.
39. Id. at 12–13.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id. at 13–14. An investigating detective later explained that Miranda “was not
unknowledgeable about his rights. He was an ex-convict . . . and had been through the routine
before.” Id. at 13.
42. Id. at 22–23.
43. Id. at 24–25, 49.
44. Id. at 60.
45. Id. at 100–02.
46. Id. at 103–06.
47. Id. at 72.
48. Id. at 72, 82, 132, 136.
49. Id. at 137–38.
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Joining Warren in the majority were Justices Black, Douglas,
Brennan and the most recent addition to the Court, Justice Abe Fortas. See Facts and Case
Summary–Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/
educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-miranda-v-arizona (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); Abe
Fortas Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.biography.com/people/abe-fortas9299311 (noting that Justice Fortas was appointed to the court in 1965).
51. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492–93.
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directed that in the absence of other safeguards, custodial interrogation is not
permitted unless police first give the suspect four specified warnings,52 and then
obtain from the suspect a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of these
rights.53
In the majority’s view, Miranda accomplished several important objectives.54
It afforded Fifth Amendment protections to criminal suspects at the pretrial
stage.55 It ensured that a suspect’s waiver of Fifth Amendment rights would be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.56 It assisted suspects in avoiding
incommunicado interrogations by police, and it helped them deal with modern
psychological ploys used by law enforcement to obtain confessions.57 It
recognized that compulsion was an inevitable attribute of custodial interrogation
and that rights warnings were needed to address this compulsion.58 And, it
established bright-line standards that could be comprehensively and consistently

52. Id. at 478–79 (“He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires.”).
53. Id. at 444 (“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”). The Miranda decision gave birth to the cottage
industry of producing rights warning cards and their widespread use by police and others who
administer Miranda rights. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 177–78. It is little known that during his
hiatus from serving prison terms, Ernesto Miranda would sell autographed rights warning cards
outside the Phoenix courthouse for a nominal sum. See LIZ SONNEBORN, MIRANDA V. ARIZONA:
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (SUPREME COURT CASES THROUGH PRIMARY SOURCES) 53 (2003).
54. The traditional involuntariness test has retained viability after Miranda, and it continues
to serve as an alternate, if less often used, basis for suppressing confessions. See, e.g., Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (applying the traditional involuntariness approach under the
Due Process Clause to a post-Miranda case).
55. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.”).
56. See id. at 479 (“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him,
the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights . . . . But unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.”).
57. See id. at 457–58 (arguing that safeguards are necessary during incommunicado
interrogations because, during those interrogations, police officers place suspects in an unfamiliar
and menacing environment to compel suspects to self-incriminate).
58. See id.; see also Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the
Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 735 (1987) (observing that Miranda
found “that compulsion inheres in custodial interrogation to such an extent that any confession, in
any case of custodial interrogation, is compelled”); Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police
Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1, 15 (2006) (explaining that Miranda’s rationale is based on a syllogism that includes the
premise that informal compulsion actually, or at least presumptively, exists in any and every form
of custodial interrogation).
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applied by police and enforced by the courts. Civil libertarians applauded the
Warren Court for its Miranda decision.59
The Court left open the possibility that Congress and the States could develop
alternatives to the Miranda warnings when it explained,
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the
States in the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities.
Therefore, we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of
the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in
no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound
efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage
Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.
However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
safeguards must be observed.60
Given all of the Court’s ambitious objectives, however, it seems clear that the
above-quoted language was not an invitation for Congress or the States to
replace the Miranda warnings with a recycled variation of the traditional
involuntariness test. Although such an approach might be adequate to ensure
that a confession was actually voluntary, it would remain vulnerable to the same
criticisms that were leveled against the traditional involuntariness test that
Miranda was meant to replace. More importantly, this approach would fail to
demonstrate in a systematic and consistent fashion that suspects were effectively
apprised of, and properly waived, their Fifth Amendment rights before being
subjected to custodial interrogation. Any acceptable alternative to the Miranda
warnings would seemingly have to satisfy these prerequisites. Accordingly,
permitted alternatives might include requiring an attorney be present anytime a
suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation or making a video record of the
rights warning and waiver.61 They might even involve enhancing the rights
warning itself with advisements about the offense of which the suspect is
59. See Richard Carelli, Court Upholds Miranda: Police Must Read Rights to Suspects,
ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (June 27, 2000) http://onlineathens.com/stories/062700/new_
0627000005.shtml#.WH1e687543Q (“Steven Shapiro of the American Civil Liberties Union
praised the [C]ourt for upholding the Miranda ruling, which he called ‘an emblem of fairness.’”);
see also BAKER, supra note 19, at 61–63 (reporting that Robert J. Corcoran, an American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) volunteer at the organization’s Phoenix office, represented Miranda at the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the ACLU covered out-of-pocket expenses for Miranda’s attorneys).
60. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 487–88 (1964); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 268–69 (1996).
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accused62 or collateral consequences of making a statement, such as deportation
and the loss of a security clearance.63 On the other hand, the clear import of the
above-quoted passage was that any attempt merely to return to the pre-Miranda
status quo would be summarily rejected.
Two additional points about the Miranda decision deserve special emphasis.
First, the Court unmistakably characterized the Miranda warnings requirement
to be of constitutional dimension rather than being merely a court-made rule.64
To this end, near the beginning of the Miranda opinion, Warren wrote about the
need “for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to
incriminate himself.”65 Warren continued that the Court granted certiorari in
Miranda “in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed,
of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation,
and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and
courts to follow.”66 Later in the opinion, Warren noted that although “Congress
and the States [were] free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so
long as they [were] fully as effective as” the Miranda warnings, “the issues
presented [were] of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the
courts.”67 Warren then explained:
As courts have been presented with the need to enforce constitutional
rights, they have found means of doing so. That was our responsibility
when Escobedo was before us and it is our responsibility today.
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.68
Perhaps most telling is that when the Court turned to the custodial interrogation
of Ernesto Miranda, it “concluded that statements were obtained from the
defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for
protection of the privilege.”69
62. See 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2012) (also known as Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which provides that “[n]o person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request
any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of
the nature of the accusation”).
63. Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miranda: Concessions for Confessions, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 905, 916 (2016); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699–700 n.16 (2002).
64. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490–91.
65. See id. at 439.
66. Id. at 441–42.
67. Id. at 490 (alteration in original).
68. Id. at 490–91 (alteration in original).
69. Id. at 491 (emphasis added); see also Yale Kamisar, Foreword, From Miranda to § 3501
to Dickerson to . . ., 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 883 (2001) [hereinafter Kamisar II] (“I venture to say
that at the time the Miranda opinion was handed down almost everyone who read it (including the
dissenting Justices) understood that it was a constitutional decision—an interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”) (alteration in original).
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The Warren Court reiterated in subsequent cases that the Miranda
requirements were derived from the Fifth Amendment rather than the Court’s
own rule-making authority. In Mathis v. United States,70 the Court reminded us
that “[its] opinion [in Miranda] stated at some length the constitutional reasons
why one in custody who is interrogated by officers about matters that might tend
to incriminate him is entitled to be warned.”71 In Orozco v. Texas,72 the Court
excluded a confession because the use of an admission “obtained in the absence
of the required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda.”73 A fair reading of Miranda,
Mathis, and Orozco leaves little doubt that the Miranda warnings requirements
were constitutional in character, at least in the minds of the Justices who joined
in the Miranda majority opinion.74
Second, the Court signaled that it would be strongly disinclined to recognize
exceptions and limitations to its newly minted Miranda rights warnings
requirement. In particular, Warren explicitly anticipated and ruled out the
possibility of an impeachment exception to the Miranda warnings when he
cautioned,
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner . . . .
[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are
often used to impeach his testimony at trial . . . . These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be
used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any
other statement.75
Further, even assuming the Court would allow for the possibility of some
exceptions or limitations to the Miranda requirements, they would have to be
supported by an especially compelling showing and would be only sparingly
recognized because the warnings themselves were constitutionally based. A
lesser basis would not justify departing from Miranda’s dictates because it
would be insufficient to justify the denial of constitutional protections.76 By any
measure, the Court intended, through Miranda, to break from tradition and

70. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
71. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
72. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
73. Id. at 326.
74. Professor Yale Kamisar argues that Justice White, a stern Miranda dissenter, likewise
understood that Miranda was a constitutional decision as reflected by remarks he made after the
decision had been announced. See Kamisar II, supra note 69, at 883–84 (quoting remarks made by
Justice White after Miranda had been decided).
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 (1966).
76. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 223 (1981) (observing that practical
problems cannot outweigh the constitutional requirement for a search warrant).
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mandate new and comprehensive police practices that would surely disrupt the
status quo.77
III. THE REACTION TO MIRANDA
The overwhelming public reaction to Miranda was loud, swift, and highly
critical. For example, Jacob Fuchsberg, a former president of the American Trial
Lawyers Association, feared that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in [Miranda]
virtually put[] an end to the effective use of confessions.”78 Professor Fred Inbau
shared “a concern on the part of law enforcement officers—and an
understandable concern—that whatever they [said] to a suspect by way of
Miranda requirements might later be considered inadequate by a judge or
appellate court.”79 Professor Ed Quevedo recalled that the Miranda decision
seemed to mark “the end of the world as we know it if you were reading the
papers. . . . People thought it would lead to lawlessness, police would be
handcuffed; we wouldn’t be able to investigate crimes, we couldn’t punish
perpetrators.”80
Public attitudes toward Miranda are vividly reflected in polling data. “[A]
Harris poll conducted a few months after the [Miranda] opinion found that 57
percent of respondents thought it ‘wrong,’ with only 30 percent calling it
‘right.’”81 A 1968 Gallup Poll taken shortly after Miranda revealed that sixtythree percent of the public felt that courts were too soft on criminals.82 These
results stood in stark contrast to a Gallup Poll that preceded Miranda, which
indicated that only fourty-eight percent of the public believed that courts had
been too lenient.83 The anti-Miranda sentiments were further bolstered by crime
statistics, which purportedly indicated that in the years immediately preceding
Miranda, the population of the United States had grown about ten percent while
77. See Fred E. Inbau, Over-Reaction—The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1449, 1460 (1999) (noting that before Miranda was decided, “the highest courts of
over thirty states, and one federal circuit court of appeals, had held that there was no constitutional
requirement that criminal suspects be warned of their self-incrimination privilege prior to police
interrogation”) (footnotes omitted).
78. Miranda Decision Said to End the Effective Use of Confessions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
1966), http://76307797.weebly.com/public-reaction.html. In his dissenting opinion in Miranda,
Justice Harlan warned, “the Court [was] taking a real risk with society’s welfare in imposing its
new regime on the country.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Inbau, supra note 77, at 1451 (alteration in original).
80. Miranda v. Arizona: Rebalancing Rights and Responsibilities, WEEBLY, http://76307797.
weebly.com/public-reaction.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
81. Bruce Peabody, Fifty Years Later, the Miranda Decision Hasn’t Accomplished What the
Supreme Court Intended, WASH. POST (June 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/13/your-miranda-rights-are-50-years-old-today-heres-how-thatdecision-has-aged/?wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1.
82. See Kenneth C. Stephan, Comment, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the
Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 NEB. L. REV. 193, 217 (1968) (citing Fred P. Graham, Congress
Tries to Curb the Court, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1968, § E, at 12).
83. Id.
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crime had risen a staggering 88 percent.84 Against this backdrop, the Warren
Court was cast by many as being lax on crime, solicitous of criminals, and
disinterested in victims.85 More to the point, the Court’s Miranda decision was
blamed for promoting lawlessness, hamstringing police, and reducing the
number of confessions obtained while increasing the likelihood of acquitting the
guilty.86
The force of the public opposition to Miranda was matched by the tenor of
the dissenting Justices’ rhetoric. For example, Justice White, a Miranda
dissenter, complained that “[t]he obvious underpinning of the Court’s decision
[was] a deep-seated distrust of all confessions.”87 White explained that “the not
so subtle overtone of the opinion [is] that it is inherently wrong for the police to
gather evidence from the accused himself.”88 He contended that the Court’s
holding had “no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the
language the Fifth Amendment.”89 White concluded that there was,
every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants who
otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has
previously thought to be the most satisfactory kind of evidence will
now under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be
tried at all or will be acquitted if the State’s evidence, minus the
confession, is put to the test of litigation.90
Justice Harlan, who also dissented in Miranda, argued that the requirement
for Miranda warnings was unnecessary because “the Due Process Clauses [of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] provide an adequate tool for coping with
confessions.”91 Harlan warned that “the thrust of the new [Miranda] rules [was]
to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and
ultimately to discourage any confession at all.”92

84. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883,
899 (2000) [hereinafter Kamisar III] (citing Toward Freedom from Fear, a position paper on crime
by presidential candidate Richard Nixon, dated May 8, 1968, and set forth at 114 CONG. REC.
12,936–39 (1968)).
85. See id. at 894–95. Emblematic of this is a prominent cartoon depicting a driver, labeled
“The Criminal,” speeding away in a car, labeled “Our Criminal Justice System,” from a jilted
hitchhiker, labeled “The Victim.” Charles Brooks, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, http://www.historytunes.
com/images/cartoons/46-1.png (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
86. See Kamisar III, supra note 84, at 894–95 (noting that newspapers and legislators across
the country accused the Warren Court of “‘coddling criminals,’ ‘handcuffing police,’ and otherwise
undermining ‘law and order’”); see also Stephan, supra note 82, at 217–18 (observing that although
it is a non-sequitur in the classic sense, it was politically effective to blame the Court for increasing
crime rates).
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 537 (White, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
89. Id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
92. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
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It was against this backdrop that Richard Nixon ran as the Republican
nominee for President in 1968. According to historian Rick Perlstein, “Nixon
reestablished himself as a figure of destiny by speaking to people’s craving for
order.”93 Targeting the Warren Court and its Miranda decision, Nixon tapped
into public anger and fear by making “law and order” a central platform in his
run for the White House.94 Liva Baker, who wrote perhaps the defining book
about the Miranda case and its relation to politics and crime, explained that
“[t]he centerpiece of [Nixon’s] law and order campaign . . . was the American
judiciary and in particular the [J]ustices of the United States Supreme Court.”95
During his acceptance speech for his party’s nomination for president at the
Republican National Convention, Nixon promised voters, “[w]e shall reestablish freedom from fear in America so that America can take the lead in reestablishing freedom from fear in the world.”96 Nixon continued,
And tonight, it is time for some honest talk about the problem of order
in the United States. Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and
those who serve on them. But let us also recognize that some of our
courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace
forces as against the criminal forces in this country and we must act to
restore that balance.97
Candidate Nixon later took aim at Miranda by name in a position paper on
crime entitled Toward Freedom from Fear.98 In the paper, Nixon urged
Congress to pass a bill that would overturn Escobedo and Miranda and restore
the voluntariness test in order to “redress the imbalance” caused by these
decisions and respond to the harm suffered by “the peace forces in our society.”99
Nixon argued that “[a]mong the contributing factors to [a sharp increase in street
crime] are the decisions of a majority of one of the United States Supreme
Court.”100 He contended,
The Miranda and Escobedo decisions of the high court have had the
effect of seriously ham stringing the peace forces in our society and
strengthening the criminal forces.
....

93. Stephen Smith & Kate Ellis, Richard Nixon—Campaign ‘68, AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA,
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/campaign68/b1.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2017).
94. Id.
95. BAKER, supra note 19, at 245 (alteration in original).
96. Richard Nixon, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican
National Convention in Miami Beach, Florida, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 8,
1968), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25968.
97. Id.
98. See 114 CONG. REC. 12,936–39 (1968).
99. Id. at 12,937.
100. Id.
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From the point of view of the peace forces, the cumulative [effect of]
these decisions has been to very nearly rule out the “confession” as an
effective and major tool in prosecution and law enforcement.
....
From the point of view of the criminal forces, the cumulative impact
of these decisions has been to set free patently guilty individuals on
the basis of legal technicalities.
....
The tragic lesson of guilty men walking free from hundreds of
courtrooms across the country has not been lost on the criminal
community.101
To help accomplish his objective of restoring law and order and correcting the
extravagances of the Warren Court, Nixon pledged to appoint strict
constructionists to the Court if he was elected President.102 With regard to
judicial appointments, Nixon explained in his position paper, “I think [the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions] point up a genuine need—a need
for future Presidents to include in their appointments to the United States
Supreme Court men who are thoroughly experienced and versed in the criminal
laws of the land.”103
Nixon’s law and order message resonated with voters. He carried 32 states
and garnered more than 300 electoral votes in the three-way 1968 presidential
election.104 When Chief Justice Warren retired from the Court in 1969,105 Nixon
had the opportunity to make good on his campaign promises and satisfy
Miranda’s many opponents, including those who were involved in a rather
spirited movement to impeach Warren because of Miranda and other decisions
rendered by the Court under his leadership.106
101. Id. (alteration in original).
102. Richard Nixon Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.biography.com/
people/richard-nixon-9424076#synopsis.
103. 114 CONG. REC. 12,938 (1968).
104. See John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Election of 1968, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1968 (last visited Feb. 18,
2017). Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, received 191 electoral votes, and George
Wallace, a third-party candidate, received 45 electoral votes. Id.
105. When Warren announced his retirement in June 1968, Johnson nominated Associate
Justice Abe Fortas to replace him as Chief Justice. Fortas was a member of the Miranda majority.
For senators who were opposed to the Miranda decision, Fortas’ nomination provided the first
opportunity to register their disenchantment via a planned filibuster. Fortas’ nomination could not
get past a procedural cloture vote to end debate, and thus it was ultimately withdrawn by Johnson.
See Charles Babington, Filibuster Precedent? Democrats Point to ‘68 and Fortas, WASH. POST
(Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45149-2005Mar17.html.
106. The Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which held that state laws
establishing separate public schools for black and white students was unconstitutional, was also a
major impetus for the impeach Warren sentiment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954). For a sampling of images of billboards and fliers urging the impeachment of Warren,
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Nixon found his ideal candidate for Chief Justice in Warren Burger, who was
himself an outspoken critic of Miranda. Before his appointment to the Supreme
Court, Burger was a frequent lecturer at law schools and bar associations, where
he routinely criticized exclusionary rules in general and Miranda in particular.
In a now famous commencement speech delivered at Ripon College in 1967,
Burger said,
[Other countries] do not consider it necessary to use a device like our
Fifth Amendment, under which an accused person may not be required
to testify. They go swiftly, efficiently and directly to the question of
whether the accused is guilty. No nation on earth goes to such lengths
or takes such pains to provide safeguards as we do, once an accused
person is called before the bar of justice and until his case is
completed.107
Burger’s approach to criminal justice, and in particular his objections to
Miranda and exclusionary rules, found favor with presidential candidate Nixon.
[I]n August 1967, Nixon had read in U.S. News & World Report
excerpts from Warren Burger’s commencement speech given at Ripon
College in Ripon, Wisconsin. He had been impressed with what
Burger said about the administration of American criminal justice.
His adaptation of the jurist’s ideas to his own speeches for the 1968
presidential campaign held significance, of course, for the immediate
future; it was also the beginning of a deeper association between the
two men . . . .108
President Nixon was inaugurated the thirty-seventh President of the United
States on January 20, 1969.109 In March of that year, Burger, serving on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, wrote a stinging

one need only Google search the term “impeach Warren.” Although less extreme than those
supporting Warren’s impeachment, several noteworthy individuals and organizations, including
Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the American Bar Association, and
the National Association of Attorneys General, “all had gone on record, with varying degrees of
credibility, as disapproving the role assumed in recent years by the U.S. Supreme Court.” See
BAKER, supra note 19, at 27; see also Earl Warren, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/earlwarren (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
107. See Ace Toscano, Warren Burger (September 17, 1907 – June 25, 1995), THE CHIEF
JUSTICES, http://www.edu.aceswebworld.com/warren_burger.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2017)
(alteration in original).
108. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 245; see also Lee Huebner, The Checkers Speech After 60
Years, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/thecheckers-speech-after-60-years/262172/ (observing that Burger likely first came to Nixon’s
attention when he sent a letter of support to Nixon during the 1952 Fund Crisis).
109. Chief Justice Warren administered the oath of office. See John Woolley & Gerhard
Peters, Richard Nixon: Oath of Office Administered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77405 (last visited Feb. 19,
2017).
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dissent in Frazier v. United States.110 In Frazier, the majority of a three-judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit, citing Miranda, returned the case to the district court
below to determine unanswered questions about the voluntariness of the
defendant’s confession.111 Burger vehemently disagreed, complaining that,
[t]he seeming anxiety of judges to protect every accused person from
every consequence of his voluntary utterances is giving rise to myriad
rules, sub-rules, variations and exceptions which even the most alert
and sophisticated lawyers and judges are taxed to follow. Each time
judges add nuances to these “rules” we make it less likely that any
police officer will be able to follow the guidelines we lay down. We
are approaching the predicament of the centipede on the flypaper—
each time one leg is placed to give support for relief of a leg already
“stuck,” another becomes captive and soon all are securely
immobilized. Like the hapless centipede on the flypaper, our efforts
to extricate ourselves from this self-imposed dilemma will, if we keep
it up, soon have all of us immobilized. We are well on our way to
forbidding any utterance of an accused to be used against him unless
it is made in open court. Guilt or innocence becomes irrelevant in the
criminal trial as we flounder in a morass of artificial rules poorly
conceived and often impossible of application.112
The Frazier decision, as Liva Baker noted, “was reported in the local press,
which was received in quantity at the White House and in which attention was
focused not on the details of either the case or the decision but on Judge Burger’s
rousing dissent.”113
On June 3, 1969, Nixon nominated Burger to serve as Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court.114 Six days later, following a three-hour debate, the Senate
confirmed Burger by a vote of seventy-four to three.115
Three years later, Nixon further reshaped the Supreme Court, now the Burger
Court, with the appointment of William Rehnquist as an Associate Justice.116
Like Burger, Rehnquist was a strong and consistent opponent of the Miranda
decision.117 When Nixon considered whether to name Rehnquist to the Court,
he was surely mindful of a memorandum Rehnquist had prepared for the Nixon

110. 419 F.2d 1161, 1171–76 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
111. Id. at 1169.
112. Id. at 1176 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 275–76.
114. Id. at 282.
115. Id. at 284. It has been reported that Nixon also considered Associate Justice Potter
Stewart, also a Miranda dissenter, for appointment as Chief Justice. See BOB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 16 (1979).
116. William Rehnquist Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Nov. 19, 2014), www.biography.com/
people/william-rehnquist-9454479.
117. See Kamisar, supra note 10.
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Justice Department a few years earlier while Rehnquist was serving as an
assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel.118 In the
memorandum, Rehnquist was critical of the Miranda decision, arguing,
The past decade has witnessed a dramatic change in the interpretation
given by the Supreme Court of the United States to the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants. Limitations both drastic and novel have
been placed on the use by both the state and federal governments of
pre-trial statements of the defendants . . . .119
Elsewhere in the memorandum, Rehnquist wrote,
The impact of Miranda and its progeny on the practices of law
enforcement officials is far-reaching. The Court is now committed to
the proposition that relevant, competent, un-coerced statements of the
defendant will not be admissible at his trial unless an elaborate set of
warnings be given which is very likely to have the effect of preventing
a defendant from making any statement at all.120
The Burger Court, now fortified by Rehnquist—and later succeeded by the
Rehnquist Court—had Miranda squarely in its sites. Although many observers
expected the newly constituted Court to overrule Miranda,121 it instead
announced several decisions that preserved Miranda in name but undermined its
constitutional status, thereby limiting its application and import. In the first of
these cases, Harris v. New York,122 the Court per Burger established an
impeachment exception to Miranda, holding that a statement taken in violation
of the Miranda warnings can be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant’s

118. See id. Professor Kamisar recounts,
On April 1, 1969, when he had been assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of
Legal Counsel for fewer than 90 days, Rehnquist sent a memorandum to John Dean (of
Watergate fame), who was then the associate deputy attorney general. The memorandum
charged that “there is reason to believe” the Warren court had tilted the scales of justice
too far in favor of criminal suspects. Rehnquist recommended that the president appoint
a national commission “to determine whether the overriding public interest in law
enforcement requires a constitutional amendment.”
Id.
119. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to John W. Dean, III, re: Constitutional
Decisions Relating to Criminal Law 1 (Apr. 1, 1969), as quoted in Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v.
United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda’s Critics—and Then Its Supporters 8 (Univ.
of San Diego Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 33, 2005),
http//digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art33.
120. Id.
121. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 396; see also Kamisar I, supra note 37, at 13 (observing
that with the departure of Earl Warren and other “liberal” members of his Court, “almost all Court
watchers expected the so-called Burger Court to treat Miranda unkindly”); David Sonenshein,
Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 407 (1982)
(arguing that the Burger “Court resolved to redress the perceived imbalance in favor of criminal
defendants over the police by narrowing the scope of the original holding” in Miranda).
122. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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direct testimony at trial.123 This result was directly at odds with Miranda itself,
in which the Warren Court in dicta had rejected the idea of an impeachment
exception.124 The Burger Court disagreed with this in Harris, reasoning that the
costs of suppressing the defendant’s confession and thereby facilitating perjury
outweighed the marginal benefits of suppression, which were limited to any
additional deterrence of police misconduct that might be achieved by
suppressing an unwarned statement for impeachment purposes.125 Harris
clearly signaled that the Burger Court would evaluate the need for Miranda
warnings in a new and less favorable fashion, one that was unabashedly
utilitarian and not constitutionally based.
Two years after Harris, the Court per Rehnquist, in Michigan v. Tucker,126
announced that Miranda’s remedy of suppressing confessions did not always
apply to derivative evidence, deeming admissible the testimony of a witness
whose identity had been discovered as a result of questioning the defendant
without providing him with a complete set of Miranda warnings.127 Later still,
in New York v. Quarles,128 the Court per Rehnquist recognized a public safety
exception to the Miranda warnings protocols.129 Finally, in Oregon v. Elstad,130
in an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and joined by
Rehnquist, the Court held that a statement made by a suspect after a proper
recitation of Miranda warnings and a waiver thereof is normally admissible even
when the suspect previously made an unwarned statement.131
In these cases, and others, the Court exercised its authority to rewrite Miranda
in the same manner to lawmakers who exercised their prerogative to amend
legislation they had drafted earlier. Recall that the Warren Court instructed, in
Miranda and subsequent decisions, that the Miranda warnings were of
constitutional dimension; that is, they originated with the Fifth Amendment.132
The Burger Court disagreed that Miranda possessed such an elevated status.
Rehnquist in particular redefined Miranda’s pedigree, calling the warnings
123. Id. at 226. Burger wrote the majority opinion in Harris, which was decided before Justice
Rehnquist joined the Court the following year. See id. at 222; see also Kamisar, supra note 10.
124. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 436, 476–77 (1966); see also supra note 77 and
accompanying text. With regard to Miranda’s comments about a possible impeachment exception,
the Harris Court explained, “Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as
indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue
was not at all necessary to the Court’s holding and cannot be regarded as controlling.” Harris, 401
U.S. at 224 (alteration in original).
125. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225–26.
126. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
127. Id. at 450–52.
128. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
129. Id. at 655–56.
130. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
131. Id. at 318.
132. See Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966); see also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S.
324, 326 (1969).
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requirement a Court-created, prophylactic rule rather than a constitutional
necessity.133 Rehnquist explained for the majority in Tucker that the Miranda
warnings “were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
was protected.”134 As the Court later instructed in Elstad, “The Miranda
exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than
the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation.”135
Rehnquist’s reductionist characterization of Miranda had significant
consequences.136 If the Court, rather than the Fifth Amendment, was now
deemed to be the source of the need to administer Miranda warnings, then it
follows that the Court had absolute authority to alter the contours of the Miranda
requirements, diminish their significance, and subordinate their application. It
was Miranda’s lesser status as a Court-made directive that allowed Rehnquist to
conclude in Quarles, for example, that a “concern for public safety must be
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules
enunciated in Miranda.”137
Congress launched a second front against Miranda shortly after the decision
was announced. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968138
was passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses.139 The legislation

133. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (describing the Miranda warning as
a “series of recommended ‘procedural safeguards’” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
443–44 (1974))); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) (highlighting that
“Miranda’s safeguards are not constitutional in character”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
203 (1989) (instructing that “[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings are ‘not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination [is] protected’” (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444)); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479
U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (explaining that “prohibition on further questioning—like other aspects of
Miranda—is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced confessions, but
is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984) (observing that it is well established that the Miranda warnings are “not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution” (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444)); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 309 (1985) (referring to “prophylactic Miranda procedures”).
134. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
135. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306; accord Williams, 507 U.S. at 690–91.
136. The Rehnquist Court re-characterized Miranda in another important way. Recall a basic
premise of the Warren Court’s Miranda decision that compulsion was an inevitable attribute of
custodial interrogation, and that rights warnings were needed to address this compulsion. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Rehnquist Court later concluded instead that a confession could be
obtained in violation of the Miranda warnings requirement and nevertheless be voluntary. See
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314–15.
137. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
139. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197, 239 (1968). The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 72–4. See RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR
OF CRIME 98 (1969). The House thereafter voted 317–60 against a conference and then 369–17 in
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included a provision known as § 3501,140 which was designed to overrule
Miranda and replace its warnings requirement with a case-by-case
determination of voluntariness based on a totality-of-the-circumstances test.141
Under § 3501, Miranda warnings would retain some relevance but would no
longer be dispositive.142 Section 3501 essentially sought to return the criminal
justice system to the pre-Miranda traditional involuntariness approach to
confessions.
The provision “was immediately seen as a bald Congressional attempt to rap
the Supreme Court’s knuckles over crime.”143 Supporters of § 3501 countered
that the legislation was needed to address “a direct connection between the
enlargement of procedural requirements and a rising crime rate”144 Another
plausible impetus for the legislation was that Congress assumed the bill,
would inevitably reach the Supreme Court for constitutional
adjudication [and thus it would] force the Supreme Court to reexamine its holding in Miranda and possibly reverse that decision. It
is possible that this course was taken in anticipation of personnel
changes on the Court which might alter the original five to four
alignment of the Miranda Court.145
Regardless of the underlying motivations for the legislation, the rhetoric by
Senate proponents of § 3501, and thus opponents of Miranda, was passionate
and sometimes vitriolic.146 For example, Senator John McClellan of Arkansas,
favor of accepting the Senate version in toto. ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS
AGAINST THE COURTS 94 (1970).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
141. Id. § 3501(a)-(b). On the issue of voluntariness, the trial judge can consider the following:
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment; (2) whether such defendant
knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected
at the time of making the confession; (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or
knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could
be used against him; (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such
defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such
confession.
Id. § 3501(b) (alteration in original).
142. Id.
143. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 319 (1970).
144. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 141 (1973);
see Inbau, supra note 77, at 1463–64 (urging the Court to modify its approach to confessions per
Miranda so that it is consistent with § 3501).
145. Stephan, supra note 82, at 218 (alteration in original).
146. Besides the rhetoric of the senators themselves,
An impressive list of law enforcement officers, district attorneys, and judges testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, alleging the deleterious effects of the Miranda
and Mallory decisions and urging congressional action of a remedial nature. The
testimony was supplemented by scores of letters and newspaper clippings blaming
Supreme Court decisions for the rising crime rate.
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who chaired the Senate subcommittee hearings on the crime bill, said during the
debate on the provision,
[I]f this confessions provision is defeated, the law-breaker will be the
beneficiary, and he will be further encouraged and reassured that he
can continue a life of crime and depredations profitably with impunity
and without punishment . . . . [If § 3501 is defeated,] every gangster
and overlord of the underworld; . . . every murderer, rapist, robber . . .
will have cause to rejoice and celebrate.
Whereas, if it is defeated, the safety of decent people will be placed in
greater jeopardy and every innocent, law-abiding . . . citizen in this
land will have cause to weep and despair.147
McClellan’s criticism of Miranda even extended to hyperbole about how the
Miranda decision might someday intrude upon the sanctity of the American
family:
Under the Court’s logic in the Miranda case, the day may come when
a parent cannot ask his child about any harm the child has committed
upon his mother without the parent giving him a warning that anything
the child says may be used against him. Should fathers and mothers
be required [to give the Miranda warnings] before they ask a child
about an act that may be criminal . . . ?148
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, a respected constitutional expert who
later gained fame as Chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee,149 was
likewise outspoken in his support for § 3501 and thus his opposition to Miranda.
Ervin said,
If you believe that the people of the United States should be ruled by
a judicial oligarchy composed of five Supreme Court Justices rather
than by the Constitution of the United States, you ought to vote against
[the bill]. If you believe that self-confessed murderers, rapists,
robbers, arsonists, burglars, and thieves ought to go unpunished, you
ought to vote against [the bill] . . . . But if you believe . . . that enough
Id. at 216–17 (footnote omitted).
147. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,155 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
McClellan also argued:
Today, why should a policeman go out and risk his life to catch a known murderer or
criminal who is armed with a gun, when the Supreme Court will find some small
technicality . . . to find a way to turn that murderer or criminal loose and then, [in its
decisions] attack the officer who risked his life and reflect upon his integrity, by inferring
that we cannot trust a policeman to do right . . . . That is their attitude.
114 CONG. REC. 13,839 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
148. 114 CONG. REC. 13,847 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. McClellan). Of
course, McClellan’s rhetoric is misplaced. The Fifth Amendment protects against Government
misconduct. It does not pertain to parent-child interactions.
149. See Revisiting Watergate, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
onpolitics/watergate/sam.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (briefly discussing Ervin’s role in the
Senate Watergate Committee).
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has been done for those who murder and rape and rob, and that
something ought to be done for those who do not wish to be murdered
or raped or robbed, then you should vote for [the bill].150
Section 3501 was reluctantly signed into law by President Johnson before he
departed office.151 The Justice Department, however, steadfastly refused to
enforce or assert the provision through succeeding administrations, including the
Nixon Administration that followed directly after Johnson’s.152 Because of the
moratorium resulting from the Justice Department’s active and unwavering
policy to avoid invoking § 3501,153 its constitutionality remained largely
150. 114 CONG. REC. 14,155 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
151. Max Frankel, President Signs Broad Crime Bill, With Objections, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1968, at 1. Johnson was no fan of § 3501. He signed the Crime Bill unenthusiastically, at the last
hour, concluding that it contained “more good than [harm].” Id.
152. See The Clinton Justice Department’s Refusal to Enforce the Law on Voluntary
Confessions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 122 (1999). The Department of Justice took the position that unless the
Court overrules Miranda, “the United States is not free to urge the lower courts” to “rely on Section
3501.” Id. (Memorandum from James K. Robinson, acting Assistant Attorney General in 1999).
Also noted was that “[t]he Department has not yet decided whether it would ask the Supreme Court
in an appropriate case to overrule or modify Miranda.” Id. at 123 (Memorandum from John C.
Keeney, acting Assistant Attorney General in 1997). See also Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should
Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1034–35 (1998) (noting
that Attorney General Ramsey Clark instructed U.S. Attorneys not to admit confessions into
evidence unless they comported with Miranda); Andrew B. Loewenstein, Note, Judicial Review
and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351, 357–62 (2001) (discussing
the Justice Department’s refusal to enforce § 3501, and that under the Clinton administration, the
Department of Justice remained steadfastly opposed to enforcing § 3501).
153. The principle reason § 3501 was untested in the courts is because the Justice Department
went to great lengths to avoid invoking it. As the Fourth Circuit noted, in the intervening years
after Miranda was decided and before Dickerson,
career federal prosecutors have tried to invoke § 3501 in [the Fourth Circuit] only to be
overruled by the Department of Justice. In March of 1997, for example, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Alexandria, Virginia, appealed the suppression of a statement that
the district court found was obtained in technical violation of Miranda. See United States
v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1998). In its brief, the U.S. Attorney’s Office urged
this Court to reverse the district court on the basis of § 3501. The Department of Justice,
however, ordered the U.S. Attorney’s Office to withdraw its brief. In its place, a brief
without any reference to § 3501 was filed. As a result, the Washington Legal Foundation
and U.S. Senators Jeff Sessions, Jon Kyl, John Ashcroft, and Strom Thurmond, filed an
amicus brief urging this Court to consider the admissibility of Sullivan’s confession
under § 3501. Because [the Fourth Circuit Court] ultimately concluded that Sullivan was
not in custody for Miranda purposes when the incriminating statements were made, [it]
had no occasion to address the applicability of § 3501.
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 682 (4th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The Justice Department similarly refused to invoke § 3501
at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In United States v. Cheely, 21 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit suppressed an
incriminating statement that was obtained in technical violation of Edwards. Id. at 923.
Although the Government did not petition for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte
asked the parties whether the case merited rehearing en banc. See Cheely v. United
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untested for decades before the courts,154 and it was never considered on the
merits by the Supreme Court.155 Miranda, albeit weakened by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, still survived as the law of the land.
It was not until 2000, in Dickerson v. United States,156 that § 3501 was fully
and finally considered by the Supreme Court. The district court in Dickerson
suppressed the defendant’s statement because, although it was voluntary in the
traditional sense, it was taken in violation of Miranda.157 This decision was
reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the defendant’s
statement was admissible under § 3501.158 By affirming the constitutionality of
States, 92-30257 (9th Cir. May 25, 1994) (unpublished order). Curiously, the Justice
Department filed a memorandum opposing further review. One week later, the Supreme
Court in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994),
would bring § 3501 to the attention of the legal community. In response, a career federal
prosecutor sent a letter to the Ninth Circuit apprising them of the Court’s decision in
Davis. Later that same day, Solicitor General Drew Days withdrew the earlier letter and
replaced it with a letter that downplayed the relevance of Davis to the issues at hand.
Notwithstanding the letter from the Solicitor General, the Ninth Circuit “called for
supplemental briefing from the parties as to the effect Davis might have on our
conclusion” to suppress the statements in question. United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d
1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994). Although Justice filed a supplemental brief, it nevertheless
failed to even argue the applicability of § 3501. Upon reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit
still suppressed the statement.
Id. at 698 n.15.
154. See generally Paul G. Cassell, The Statue that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the
Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 217–18 (1999) (discussing the absence of judicial
review of § 3501). Indeed, federal courts of any kind had squarely dealt with § 3501 only twice
before Dickerson was decided. See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir. 1975)
(holding that the trial court did not err when it applied § 3501 in concluding the defendant’s
confession was voluntary); United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1435–36 (D. Utah
1977) (holding that § 3501 is constitutional and thus its analysis is the proper standard to determine
admissibility of defendants’ statements).
155. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 681. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), questioned whether the Department of Justice’s failure to invoke §
3501 was “consistent with the Executive’s obligation to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.’” Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
156. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
157. Id. at 432. The Fourth Circuit Court below reached the same conclusion that the
defendant’s statement was voluntary. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (“Although the district court
specifically found that Dickerson’s confession was voluntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment,
it nevertheless suppressed the confession because it was obtained in technical violation of
Miranda.”).
158. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695. The way in which the issue involving § 3501 was presented
to and then addressed by the Fourth Circuit Court was rather convoluted. At the district court
below, the government did not assert § 3501 as a basis for admitting Dickerson’s confession. Id.
at 672. When the government lost at the district court (in a memorandum opinion) and the
confession was suppressed, it requested reconsideration by the district court, this time asserting
compliance with § 3501 as a basis for reconsideration. Id. at 675–76. The district court denied the
motion for reconsideration. See United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1023 (E.D. Va.
1997). The government then appealed the district court’s decision to the Fourth Circuit. Dickerson,
166 F.3d at 677. Section 3501 was not, however, briefed by the government at the Fourth Circuit
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§ 3501, the Fourth Circuit necessarily concluded that Congress had the authority
to overrule Miranda and restore the traditional voluntariness test.159 As the
Fourth Circuit explained in its Dickerson decision,
Congress, pursuant to its power to establish the rules of evidence and
procedure in the federal courts, acted well within its authority in
enacting § 3501. As a consequence, § 3501, rather than Miranda,
governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court.160
The Fourth Circuit noted in Dickerson that Miranda retained some
significance under § 3501.
Congress did not completely abandon the central holding of Miranda,
i.e., the four warnings are important safeguards in protecting the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed, § 3501
specifically lists the Miranda warnings as factors that a district court
should consider when determining whether a confession was
voluntarily given.161
The Miranda decision, in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Arthur
Goldberg, now found itself “twisting slowly in the wind.”162 At last, the stage
was fully set for the Rehnquist Court to pass judgment on Miranda’s continued
viability.
IV. MIRANDA SURVIVES
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dickerson in 1999,163 it seemed
as if Miranda’s day of reckoning would soon arrive. In the words of Professor
Donald Dripps,
Once the Court granted [certiorari in Dickerson], court-watchers knew
the hour had come. At long last the Court would have to either
repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases, or offer
some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent.164

as a basis for reversal. Judge Karen Williams, writing for the two-judge majority at the Fourth
Circuit, considered § 3501 sua sponte, explaining that the government’s decision to forego invoking
§ 3501 did not prevent the court from addressing the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 683; see
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (stating that the issues to be determined are within
the discretion of the courts of appeals). See generally Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421–
23 (1996) (discussing the extent to which the district courts have the power to act sua sponte).
159. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 686–87.
162. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REV. 177, 182
(1985).
163. Dickerson v. United States, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999).
164. See Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson,
Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 33 (2001)
(alteration in original).
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Many predicted Miranda’s demise because of all that had happened over the
previous thirty-five years since it was decided.165 The 5–4 Supreme Court
decision in Miranda was widely unpopular. Congress had swiftly and
overwhelmingly passed § 3501, which overruled Miranda.166 The legislation
was signed by the President and upheld by the Fourth Circuit. Years later, when
the statute finally reached the Supreme Court for its consideration, that Court
had been significantly reconstituted as a more conservative body led by a Chief
Justice who was a longtime critic of Miranda.167 Indeed, the fate of § 3501, and,
thus, Miranda would be decided by a majority of Justices who joined together
in a multi-decade project of diminishing Miranda’s status and influence. It was
the perfect storm. All three branches of government and the public seemed
aligned against Miranda, and all the pieces were now in place for the Court to
deliver the coup de grace.168
But a funny thing happened on the way to the guillotine. The Supreme Court
in Dickerson instead struck down § 3501 and thereby ensured Miranda’s
continued vitality.169 More surprisingly, it did so by an overwhelming 7–2
vote.170 Most surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion.171
Rehnquist explained the Court’s rationale in Dickerson as follows:
In Miranda v. Arizona, we held that certain warnings must be given
before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation could
be admitted in evidence. In the wake of that decision, Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which in essence laid down a rule that the
165. See GARY L. STUART, MIRANDA: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
167–68 (2004) (noting that before Dickerson, many thought the Court would overrule Miranda).
166. Lucian Paul Sbarra, Note, Wiping the Dust Off of an Old Statute: United States v.
Dickerson Eliminates the Miranda Warnings, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 481–82 (2000).
167. See Dripps, supra note 164, at 3.
168. See Sbarra, supra note 166, at 497 (contending that “the interplay between the Department
of Justice’s repeated failure to § 3501 and the Supreme Court’s limits on the Miranda rule provided
the fuel for the Dickerson court to pronounce § 3501 as constitutional and to eradicate the necessity
for the Miranda warnings”). On the other hand, some commentators were optimistic that Miranda
would survive Dickerson. See STUART, supra note 165, at 112–14.
169. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
170. Id. at 430.
171. Id. at 431. The oral argument at the Supreme Court in the Dickerson case was somewhat
irregular. Of course, counsel representing Dickerson did not argue in support of § 3501. Consistent
with its past policies, the Justice Department likewise did not defend the constitutionality of the
statute. Accordingly, the Court appointed Professor Paul Cassell to serve as an amicus and argue
in defense of § 3501. Cassell, a former Rehnquist clerk, was no doubt selected for this task because
he was a prominent and longtime critic of Miranda. See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1058–59 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs:
The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1996); Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 390 (1996)
[hereinafter Cassell I].
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admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not
they were voluntarily made. We hold that Miranda, being a
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by
an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.
We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern
the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in
both state and federal courts.172
Regardless of whether one approves of the result in Dickerson, there is general
agreement that Rehnquist’s majority opinion was tepid and uninspiring. The
criticism is fair, as his opinion reads more like a compromise report of a divided
committee than the principled expression of a scholarly jurist.173 Professor Paul
Cassell called Rehnquist’s opinion in Dickerson “skimpy” and “jerry-built.”174
Professor Yale Kamisar described it as “rather flat.”175 Professor Susan Klein
said the opinion was “in a word, terrible.”176 Professor Donald Dripps
complained it was “intentionally written to say less rather than more.”177
Critiques aside, however, the more remarkable feature of Rehnquist’s opinion in
Dickerson is not its lackluster quality but rather its surprising result, that is,
Miranda’s reprieve.
The question begs to be asked: why would “Rehnquist, for decades an
implacable critic of Miranda,”178 ride to its rescue in Dickerson? The most
widely accepted, albeit speculative, explanation is that because Rehnquist did
not have the votes to overrule Miranda, he decided to join the majority and
minimize damage.179 The theory goes like this: if Rehnquist had stayed true to
his beliefs and instead voted with the dissenting Justices in Dickerson, Justice
John Paul Stevens, perhaps the strongest proponent of Miranda who was then
on the Court, would have likely written the majority opinion.180 Fearing this,
Rehnquist joined the pro-Miranda majority in Dickerson so he could assign the
case to himself and thus block Stevens from attempting to resurrect Miranda to
the elevated status it had enjoyed under the Warren Court.181 In particular,
172. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431–32 (citation omitted).
173. See id. at 438–39.
174. Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REV. 898, 902 (2001) [hereinafter Cassell II].
175. Kamisar II, supra note 69, at 893.
176. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1071 (2001).
177. Dripps, supra note 164, at 3.
178. Id.
179. See STUART, supra note 165, at 122–23.
180. When the Chief Justice dissents, the writing of the majority opinion is assigned by the
Senior Justice among those voting in the majority. See Supreme Court Procedures, UNITED
STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/abouteducational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). In the case of
Dickerson, this would have been Stevens.
181. See STUART, supra note 165, at 122–23.
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Rehnquist could have been concerned that if Stevens used Dickerson to reestablish Miranda’s constitutional standing, this would set the stage for the
Court in the future to undo the various exceptions and limitations to Miranda
instituted over the years under Burger’s and Rehnquist’s leadership. Consistent
with this reasoning, if the split among the Justices had instead been 4–4, rather
than 6–2, in opposition to § 3501, Rehnquist would have joined the other side
and authored an opinion striking down Miranda. Because Rehnquist did not
have the votes needed to overrule Miranda, he opted instead to join the majority
and preserve a diminished Miranda rather than voting with the dissent and
thereby risking the resuscitation of an invigorated Miranda.
There are other possible, albeit speculative, explanations for Rehnquist’s
actions in Dickerson. Rehnquist could have regarded Dickerson as an
opportunity for the Court to assert and maintain its power vis-à-vis Congress,
which made no secret of its intent to overrule Miranda through § 3501.
Professor Craig Bradley, a former Rehnquist clerk, wrote about Dickerson, “for
the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda itself is one thing, to stand by while
Congress does this is quite another. In Dickerson, the majority, which included
O’Connor, sent a strong message to Congress: Stay off our turf!”182
Professors Michael Dorf and Barry Friedman were just as emphatic when
proposing the explanation that,
[Section 3501] was a slap at the Court, and if any Court was likely to
slap back, it was [the Dickerson Court]. For the Court that in recent
years has given us [various decisions] favoring its own power at the
expense of Congress, [§] 3501 was a gnat that ran into the windshield
of whatever it was that Miranda held.183
This theory may also explain the surprising consensus of opinion reflected in
an overwhelming 7–2 vote in Dickerson without any concurring opinions. It
could well be that Rehnquist and most of his colleagues endeavored to form as
united a front as possible because they were directly confronting Congress by
striking down § 3501. There is precedent for the Court seeking broad internal
consensus when opposing a co-equal branch of the government. In Nixon v.
United States,184 for example, the Court found itself in an adversarial posture
vis-à-vis the President in deciding whether the “Watergate tapes” were
privileged.185 There, the Court decided the issue against the President’s interests
182. See Craig Bradley, Supreme Court Review Behind the Dickerson Decision, TRIAL, Oct.
2000, at 80.
183. Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 61, 72 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
184. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In Nixon, the Court held that tapes of Nixon’s conversations were
not privileged and had to be released, concluding that there is no “absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.” Id. at 706. Ironically, it was
Burger who delivered the Court’s unanimous opinion in Nixon, joined by among others Justices
Blackman and Powell, who were also Nixon appointees.
185. Id. at 687–90.
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by an 8–0 vote.186 It has been widely reported that the Justices worked together
to arrive at a unanimous decision as Nixon had earlier said that he would comply
with a “definitive order” by the Court, which, some speculated, signaled he
might defy a split decision.187 In Dickerson, Rehnquist and six other Justices
may have likewise joined together to forge a united front when asserting the
Court’s authority over Congress on matters of constitutional interpretation and
application.188
Closely related to the imperative to defend the Court’s turf could have been
Rehnquist’s desire to assume a strong leadership role as the Chief Justice.
Rehnquist could advance this objective by assembling a decisive majority in
Dickerson, even if this meant authoring an uninspired consensus opinion that
required him to subordinate his personal views that he had more freely expressed
as an Associate Justice.189 This reasoning may help explain the 7–2 vote to strike
down the statute without any concurring or separate opinions. Rehnquist may
have persuaded Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy,
seemingly the swing votes in Dickerson,190 to join a compromise opinion
preserving a diminished Miranda without writing separately in exchange for
Stevens, an enthusiastic supporter of Miranda, to do the same. Justice Antonin
Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, delivered a broadside dissent in
Dickerson that most observers agree scored points at the majority’s expense.191
However, Rehnquist’s opinion barely acknowledges, let alone fully addresses,
Scalia’s dissent. The absence of a forceful response to the dissenting Justices
could reflect that Rehnquist was less concerned about engaging issues and
garnering scholarly approval than he was about forming and leading a unified
seven-Justice majority.192
186. Id. at 707; see STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF
RICHARD NIXON 508 (1990) (explaining that Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, recused himself
from the case because of his past association with the Nixon administration).
187. Bruce Kauffman, The United States v. Nixon: A Unanimous Supreme Court Decision,
HISTORY LESSONS (Jul. 28, 2012), http://historylessons.net/the-united-states-v-nixon-a-unanimous
-supreme-court-decision (observing that “before the trial began[,] Nixon had said he would abide
by ‘a definitive order’ by the [C]ourt, which most [J]ustices took to mean that if they produced a
split decision, Nixon might defy the ruling. Therefore, even though the [J]ustices were divided on
many issues, they voted unanimously to impress upon Nixon that the [C]ourt must be obeyed.”).
188. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000). Years earlier under Warren’s
leadership, the Court worked together to forge a unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding unconstitutional state laws establishing separate
public schools for black and white students). Unanimity was assigned great importance by the
Court in Brown, as it anticipated resistance to court-ordered desegregation, especially in some of
the Southern states. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 798–803 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. See Cassell II, supra note 174, at 900.
190. See Dripps, supra note 164, at 62.
191. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dorf & Friedman, supra note
183, at 69–70.
192. In the words of Professor Dripps,
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Also, Rehnquist and the Dickerson majority may have preserved a diminished
Miranda because of a fear of the unknown. If the Court had instead affirmed §
3501 and thereby struck down Miranda, this would have essentially reestablished the traditional involuntariness test for the admissibility of
confessions, at least in federal trials. This, in turn, would have reignited the
same complaints about the old involuntariness approach, including that it failed
to provide adequate standards and was largely ineffective in protecting suspects
against excesses by the police. Moreover, states would not have to follow suit
and could instead establish their own requirements for custodial interrogation as
long as they provided at least as much protection as afforded by the Fifth
Amendment as implemented via § 3501.193 While some states would surely
adopt an approach that replicated § 3501, others would likely opt to retain the
Miranda warnings requirements194 or establish different standards. The result
would be an undesirable and complicated hodgepodge of rules and protections
that would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Beyond all of this, it is uncertain how a pre-Miranda approach to custodial
interrogation would actually be applied to 21st Century America in which public
acceptance of the Miranda warning requirements has dramatically grown;
police, prosecutors, and defense counsel have for decades adjusted their
procedures and structured their roles to account for Miranda and its

The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist, for decades an implacable critic of Miranda, wrote
the majority opinion, is more than one of those rich ironies with which our constitutional
history abounds. It is also a sure sign of a compromise opinion, intentionally written to
say less rather than more, for the sake of achieving a strong majority on the narrow
question of Miranda’s continued vitality.
Dripps, supra note 164, at 3.
193. See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 666 N.W.2d 881, 897 (Wis. 2003) (holding that physical
evidence obtained as a direct result of an intentional violation of Miranda warnings is deemed to
be inadmissible under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, even though such evidence
would be admissible under United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)); see generally Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that “[f]ederal interests
are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens than the
Federal Constitution requires”); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1977) (discussing how state constitutions can afford
greater protection of individual rights than the Federal Constitution).
194. The states would be free to retain the Miranda warnings and waiver requirements as a
matter of state law, either via the state constitution or state statute. For example, in Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court adopted for the federal system a broad, totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis for evaluating the reliability of information provided by an informant. Id. at 214. Gates
replaced the more rigorous approach required by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39. Although fourty-five
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Gates approach, six states continue to adhere
to the prior and more rigorous standards provided by Aguilar and Spinelli. See Sean C. Monaghan,
Gates v. Aguilar-Spinelli Test, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, & EXECUTIVE
MATERIALS, http://users.wfu.edu/wrightrf/Aspen-Students/statesurveys_aguilarspinelli.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2017).
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requirements.195 Recall that opinion polls taken before and shortly after the
Miranda decision reflected that the public strongly opposed Miranda, and the
Court’s role in establishing warning requirements.196 Years later, in a later poll
taken shortly after the Dickerson decision, an overwhelming ninety-four percent
of Americans said the police should inform suspects of their constitutional rights
before questioning them.197 Over time, the public came to endorse Miranda.
Finally, there is no doubt Miranda had some beneficial effect of curbing
excesses by the police when seeking confessions from criminal suspects. If the
Miranda warnings were no longer required, the Court may have feared that
police might backslide. And, because Miranda became so widely known and
deeply engrained in the broader culture, many criminal suspects subjected to
custodial interrogation would no doubt ask police about their “Miranda rights”
even if Miranda had been overruled.198 How should the police properly respond
to these questions in a post-Miranda world? Rehnquist and other Justices may
have reasoned that if the Court is going to overrule the most famous criminal
procedure case in American history, it should at least be relatively confident
Miranda would be replaced by a uniform approach for interrogating suspects
that is readily capable of a prompt, effective, and uncomplicated implementation
and use. Perhaps the Court declined to overrule Miranda for no other reason but
for the doubt that these objectives could be painlessly accomplished and the
uncertainty of the unintended consequences that would follow its demise.

195. My guess is that some states would retain the requirement for Miranda warnings or an
equivalent approach via legislation or rules of criminal procedure. Regardless, it is likely that most
jurisdictions and police departments would routinely continue to administer Miranda warnings as
a matter of practice and procedure. As noted later in this article, over the years, police have
successfully adjusted to Miranda and the warnings requirements without measurably reducing the
likelihood of obtaining a confession. See infra notes 208–212, and accompanying text. In most
cases under § 3501, prosecutors would likely resort to a totality-of-the-circumstances test for
admissibility of a confession only when there was a defect or omission of the Miranda warnings.
On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions would probably dispense with Miranda warnings and
return to pre-Miranda interrogation practices, at least initially, but some of these may later return
to administering the warnings if confessions were being suppressed by judges at a higher rate.
196. Bruce Peabody, Fifty Years Later, the Miranda Decision Hasn’t Accomplished What the
Supreme Court Intended, WASH. POST (June 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/13/your-miranda-rights-are-50-years-old-today-heres-how-thatdecision-has-aged/?wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1.
197. Supreme Court’s Miranda Decision, GALLUP (June 27, 2000), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/2779/supreme-courts-miranda-decision.aspx. At the same time, the public was about evenly
divided over whether confessions obtained without informing defendants of their rights should be
admissible in trial, with forty-five percent saying they should be while forty-nine percent
responding that they should not be. Id.
198. See id.
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V. MIRANDA’S NEXT FIFTY YEARS
Any hopes that Dickerson signaled the rebirth of an invigorated Miranda were
quickly dashed. In United States v. Patane,199 decided in 2004, a detective
questioned a suspect about a pistol he allegedly possessed without first
complying with the Miranda warnings and waiver requirements.200 The suspect
told the detective where to find the pistol, which the detective then seized.201
Relying heavily on pre-Dickerson cases, the Court barred the use of the
statement itself but allowed the pistol to be introduced into evidence.202 A
majority of the Court, including Rehnquist, seemed to attach no significance to
the fact that Dickerson, per Rehnquist, stated a few years earlier that Miranda
“announc[ed] a constitutional rule.”203 Patane makes clear that although
Dickerson preserved Miranda, it did so in its pre-Dickerson, diminished form.
The Miranda we know today—that is, the post-Dickerson and post-Patane
version of it—is far different than the Miranda of fifty years ago. In its early
years, Miranda was countercultural and destabilizing.204 Over time, it became
mainstream. This ossification is not unlike that experienced by a long-haired
rock star from the 1960s whom parents despised, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) fined, and overflowing stadium crowds cheered. Decades
later, we find that the same rock icon, now worn and battle-scarred, enjoys a
high Q rating, appears in nostalgic minivan commercials, and headlines county
fairs. Miranda, like a middle-aged former rock star, has entered into its sedate,
golden years.

199. 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
200. Id. at 635.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 633. The Court specifically instructed that “nothing in Dickerson, including its
characterization of Miranda as announcing a constitutional rule, changes” any of the prior
limitations or exceptions to the warning requirements. Id. at 640 (citation omitted).
203. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (alteration in original).
204. See Stephan, supra note 82, at 217–18; see also Kamisar III, supra note 84, at 894–95.
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Indeed, Miranda has become universally accepted and even preferred.205
Police have become comfortable with the need to provide Miranda warnings.206
By now all active law enforcement officers have grown up exclusively with
Miranda and have been trained to comply with its requirements.207 Miranda is
comparatively easy for police to follow. It provides clear guidance to law
enforcement for securing a rights waiver and imposes no other serious
impediments upon their efforts to obtain confessions.208 Since Dickerson, the
Court has seriously rebuked the police in Miranda’s name only once, when they
deliberately sought to exploit the required warnings through a carefully planned
process so as to undermine Fifth Amendment protections.209 Although Miranda
imposes some absolute requirements upon the police, these are clearly defined
and can be readily satisfied with little difficulty.210 After decades of practice
205. This is not to suggest that the substantive criticism of the Miranda decision has been
convincingly addressed or universally rejected. But although many of these critiques remain
relevant, they are no longer regularly voiced. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in
Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2667–69, 2672 (1994);
see also Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH L. REV. 1086, 1086 (1994) (arguing that Miranda lacks both
historical and textual support); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417,
1433–35, 1441–43 (1985) (arguing that (a) the traditional involuntary test was adequate and thus
the Miranda protocols were unnecessary and irrational, and (b) that Miranda is anti-confession and
misguidedly seeks to level the playing field between criminal suspects and the police); Paul G.
Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of
Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 871–72 (1996); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr.,
Miranda in Pittsburgh—A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1967) (arguing, with the
support of data, that Miranda is injurious to law enforcement); Cassell I, supra note 171, at 418,
438–40; Milhizer, supra note 58, at 39–48 (arguing that Miranda’s reliance on psychological theory
to justify the need for rights warnings is problematic.); Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After
Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 27
(2008) (arguing that “Miranda represents a veritable triumph of quasi voluntariness over reliability,
i.e., not the voluntariness of a confession itself but rather the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver
that permits custodial interrogation that can lead to a confession”); YALE KAMISAR, POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 86–87 (1980) (observing that
“a cogent criticism of the old ‘voluntariness’ test also applies to Miranda,” i.e., that because the
critical events occur in secrecy the admissibility of the confession will be determined by the
outcome of a “swearing contest” in court).
206. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1011–12 (2001).
207. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
208. See Leo, supra note 206, at 1015; see also Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain
Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1213, 1217, 1246 (2001) (noting that
Miranda imposes few, if any, meaningful restraints on post-waiver police interrogation methods).
209. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616–18 (2004) (holding that if the deliberate
two-step strategy (i.e., obtaining a second confession after Miranda warnings as a continuation of
a previously unwarned confession) has been used, post-warning statements that are related to the
substance of pre-warning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before
the post-warning statement is made).
210. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 510 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer]; see
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honed by trial and error, the police have expertly incorporated Miranda warnings
into their interrogation procedures without unduly compromising their ultimate
objective of obtaining admissible confessions.211 The Miranda decision has
even been praised by law enforcement authorities because it has “provided an
opportunity to professionalize the police.”212
Prosecutors have come to like Miranda. When the police have obtained a
waiver of Miranda rights, as they frequently do,213 the corresponding confession
is almost always bulletproof from defense attack. Miranda can be said “to
liberate the police,”214 and thus help prosecutors because compliance with the
warnings protocols substantially reduces the likelihood that a court will conclude
that the interrogation process was coercive under the traditional involuntariness
approach.215 A properly executed and signed Miranda rights waiver certificate
is, for all practical purposes, often the beginning and the end of a motion to
suppress a confession.216 Over time, Miranda has become as much a sword for
the prosecution as it is a shield for criminal suspects.217
Of course, defense counsel also support Miranda. Even with all of its faults
and shortcomings, the Miranda warning requirements provide superior
protection to criminal suspects as compared to the traditional voluntariness

also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 456–57 (1987)
[hereinafter Schulhofer I] (arguing that Miranda has had little impact on law enforcement’s ability
to obtain confessions). Further, as the forensic sciences have advanced, the need for confessions
to obtain convictions has correspondingly diminished.
211. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & MARY L. PITMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 139–41, 144, 147–50 (2010) (observing that police have an extensive
repertoire of ploys to cause suspects to confess, including flattery and ingratiation, veiled threats,
and deception.).
212. See Yale Kamisar, Landmark Ruling’s Had No Detrimental Effect, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
1, 1987, at A27, as quoted in Schulhofer I, supra note 210, at 458 n.59; see also Richard A. Leo,
Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 268 nn. 13–15, 272 (1996)
(finding, based on the observation of 122 interrogations and examination of 60 videotapes of
interrogations in police departments operating in three urban areas with populations ranging from
about 116,000 to 372,000, that approximately 78% of suspects waived their Miranda rights); see
also Cassell & Hayman, supra note 205, at 859–60 (concluding, based on the examination of 129
interrogations conducted with Salt Lake County, Utah, that approximately 84% of suspects waived
their Miranda rights).
213. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 205, at 859 (noting that 83.7% of suspects waive their
Miranda rights).
214. Schulhofer I, supra note 210, at 454.
215. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a defendant
can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact
that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”).
216. See McCarty, 468 U.S. at 430.
217. See STUART, supra note 165, at 101 (observing that “as of 1988, less than 1 percent of all
American criminal cases had been dismissed because of ‘unwarned’ confessions. And only a
fraction of that 1 percent was dismissed for noncompliance with Miranda.”); see also Schulhofer,
supra note 210, at 502 (explaining that “[f]or all practical purposes, Miranda’s empirically
detectable harm to law enforcement shrinks virtually to zero”).
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approach.218 The obligation to give Miranda warnings and obtain a waiver can
curb many possible police excesses, and it allows for the systematic involvement
of defense counsel during the investigatory stage of trial.
For all these reasons, Miranda’s next fifty years thus seem far more secure
than its first five decades. No organized or motivated anti-Miranda constituency
still exists. Miranda is no longer polarizing, threatening, counter-cultural, or
extreme. It has instead become an unassuming fact of life that imposes only
modest requirements on law enforcement, which are easily and routinely
satisfied. As Professor Leo put it, “Once feared to be the equivalent of sand in
the machinery of criminal justice, Miranda has now become a standard part of
the machine.”219
This is the final and perhaps greatest irony of Miranda’s circuitous legal and
political journey. When Miranda burst onto the scene, it was revolutionary and
destabilizing. It was bold and threatening. In its original form, it was too big to
succeed. Fifty years later, after being relentlessly eroded and diminished,
Miranda has become widely accepted,220 rather innocuous and seemingly
indispensable. In its reduced state, Miranda has become too big to fail.221

218. See STUART, supra note 165, at 103–04.
219. See Leo, supra note 206, at 1027.
220. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
221. There is likewise a final irony in the personal story of Ernesto Miranda. After being
released on parole for his last criminal convictions, Miranda frequented a seedy area of Phoenix
known as the Deuce section. In a bar located in Deuce section on the evening of January 31, 1976,
Miranda was involved in a dispute about cheating during a card game. The argument turned violent
and ended when one of the card players stabbed Miranda to death. Although the perpetrator evaded
the police, his alleged accomplice was arrested and taken to the stationhouse for questioning. As
was now required by the Supreme Court, the officers first advised the suspect of his Miranda
warnings. The suspect declined to waive his rights and answer questions, and therefore was
ultimately released because of a lack of evidence. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 408–09. It thus
seems quite likely that those responsible for Miranda’s death avoided conviction because of the
protections afforded to them by the rights warning and waiver protocols bearing their victim’s
name.
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